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ABSTRACT
Private information about prospective borrowers produced by a bank can affect  rival lenders due
to a "winner’s curse" effect. Strategic interaction between banks with respect to the intensity of
costly information production results in endogenous credit cycles, periodic "credit crunches."
Empirical tests are constructed based on parameterizing public information about relative bank
performance that is at the root of banks’ beliefs about rival banks’ behavior. Consistent with the
theory, we find that the relative performance of rival banks has predictive power for subsequent
lending  in  the  credit  card  market,  where  we  can  identify  the  main  competitors.  At  the
macroeconomic level, we show that the relative bank performance of commercial and industrial
loans is an autonomous source of macroeconomic fluctuations. We also find that the relative bank
performance is a priced risk factor for both banks and nonfinancial firms. The factor-coefficients for











In this paper we show that periodic credit crunches, swings between high and low credit alloca-
tions, are an inherent part of banking due to the way banks compete for borrowers. The amount
of information that banks produce about potential borrowers, and the amount of credit banks
are willing to extend, varies through time due to strategic interaction between competing banks.
Credit cycles can occur without any change in the macroeconomic environment. We investigate this
ampliﬁcation mechanism and provide empirical evidence that bank credit cycles are an important
autonomous part of business cycle dynamics. Extensive empirical tests of the model are presented,
based on parameterizing the public information that is the basis for banks’ beliefs about rivals’
strategies. These information measures concern rival banks’ relative performance, encapsulated in
a Performance Diﬀerence Index (PDI). The empirical behavior of U.S. bank credit card lending,
commercial and industrial lending, and bank proﬁtability, are consistent with the model. Bank
credit cycles are a systematic risk. We ﬁnd that, consistent with this, the PDI is a priced factor
in an asset pricing model of bank stock returns. Most importantly, the PDI is a priced factor for
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms as well, and increasingly so as ﬁrm size declines.
Changes in bank credit allocation, sometimes called "credit crunches," appear to be an impor-
tant part of macroeconomic dynamics. Bank lending is procyclical.1 Rather than change the price
of loans, the interest rate, banks sometimes ration credit.2 A dramatic example in the U.S. is
the period shortly after the Basel Accord was agreed in 1988, during which time the share of U.S.
total bank assets composed of commercial and industrial loans fell from about 22.5 percent in 1989
to less than 16 percent in 1994. At the same time, the share of assets invested in government
securities increased from just over 15 percent to almost 25 percent.3 More generally, it has been
noted that banks vary their lending standards or credit standards.
Bank “lending standards” or “credit standards” are the criteria by which banks determine and
rank loan applicants’ risks of loss due to default, and according to which a bank then makes its
lending decisions. While not observable, there is a variety of evidence showing that while lend-
ing rates are sticky, banks do, in fact, change their lending standards.4 The most direct evidence
1See Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi (2000), Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), and Lown and Morgan (2002).
2Bank loan rates are sticky. Berger and Udell (1992) regress loan rate premiums against open market rates
and control variables and ﬁnd evidence of “stickiness.” (Also, see Berger and Udell (1992) for references to the
prior literature.) With respect to credit card rates, in particular, Ausubel (1991) has also argued that they are
“exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds” (p. 50).
3See Keeton (1994) and Furﬁne (2001). This episode is the focus of the empirical literature on credit crunches.
See Bernanke and Lown (1991), Hall (1993), Berger and Udell (1994), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Hancock and
Wilcox (1994), Brinkman and Horvitz (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1995), and Beatty and Gron (2001). Gorton and
Winton (2002) provide a brief survey of the credit crunch literature.
4In the absence of detailed information about banks’ internal workings, it is not exactly clear what is meant
by the term "lending standards." It can refer to all the elements that go into making a credit decision, including
credit scoring models, the lending culture, the number of loan oﬃcers and their seniortiy and experience, the banks’
heirarchy of decision-making, and so on.
1comes from the Federal Reserve System’s Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices.5 Banks are asked whether their "credit standards" for approving loans (excluding merger
and acquisition-related loans) have “tightened considerably, tightened somewhat, remained basi-
cally unchanged, eased somewhat, or eased considerably.” Lown and Morgan (2001) examine this
survey evidence and note that, except for 1982, every recession was preceded by a sharp spike in the
percentage of banks reporting a tightening of lending standards. Other evidence that bank lending
standards change is econometric. Asea and Blomberg (1998) examined a large panel data set of
bank loan terms over the period 1977 to 1993 and “demonstrate that banks change their lending
standards - from tightness-to laxity-systematically over the cycle” (p. 89), and they conclude that
cycles in bank lending standards are important in explaining aggregate economic activity.
In a macroeconomic context changes in the Fed Lending Standards Index (the percentage of
respondents reporting tightening) Granger-causes changes in output, loans, and the federal funds
rate, but the macroeconomic variables are not successful in explaining variation in the lending
standards index. The Lending Standards Index is exogenous with respect to the other variables
in the Vector Autoregression system. See Lown and Morgan (2001, 2002) and Lown, Morgan
and Rohatgi (2000).6 The analysis in this paper is aimed at explaining the forces that cause
lending standards to change and, in particular, to explaining how this can happen independently
of macroeconomic variables.
When competing with each other to lend, banks produce information about potential borrowers
in an environment where they do not know how much information is being produced by rival bank
lenders.7 We study a model of bank competition in which banks collude to set high loan rates
(hence loan rates are sticky), and they implicitly agree not to (over-) invest in costly information
production about prospective borrowers.8 A bank can strategically produce more information than
its rivals and then select the better borrowers, leaving unknowing rivals with adversely selected loan
5The survey is conducted quarterly and covers major banks from all parts of the U.S., accounting for between 60
and 70 percent of commercial and industrial loans in the U.S. The Federal Reserve System’s “Senior Loan Oﬃcer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices” was initiated in 1964, but results were only made public starting in 1967.
Between 1984:1 and 1990:1 the question concerning lending standards was dropped. See Schreft and Owens (1991).
Current survey results are available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/>.
6They also ﬁnd that changes in bank lending standards matter much more for the volume of bank loans and
aggregate output than do commercial loan rates, consistent with the ﬁnding that loan rates do not move as much as
would be dictated by market rates.
7Broecker (1990) observed that the information asymmetry also aﬀects the banks themselves and means that
banks compete with each other in a special way. In Broecker’s (1990) model, banks use noisy, independent, credit
worthiness tests to assess the riskiness of potential borrowers. Because the tests are imperfect, banks may mistakenly
grant credit to high-risk borrowers who they would otherwise reject. As the number of banks increases, the likelihood
that an applicant will pass the test of at least one bank rises. Banks face an inherent winner’s curse problem in this
setting. In Broecker’s model banks do not behave strategically in a dynamic way.
8Strategic interaction between banks seems natural because banking is highly concentrated. Entry into banking
is restricted by governments. In developed economies the share of the largest ﬁve banks in total bank deposits ranges
from a high of 81.7% in Holland to a low of 26.3% in the United States. See the Group of Ten (2001). In less
developed economies, bank concentration is typically much higher (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003)).
2portfolios. Unlike standard models of imperfect competition, following Green and Porter (1984),
there are no price wars among banks since banks do not change their loan rates. However, as in
Green and Porter (1984), intertemporal incentives to maintain the collusive arrangement requires
periods of "punishment." Here these correspond to credit crunches. In a credit crunch all banks
increase their costly information production intensity, that is, they raise their "lending standards,"
and stop making loans to some borrowers who previously received loans. These swings in credit
availability are caused by banks’ changing beliefs, based on public information about rivals, about
the viability of the collusive arrangement.
Empirically testing models of repeated strategic interaction of ﬁrms has focused on price wars.
See Reiss and Wolak (2003) and Bresnahan (1989) for surveys of the literature. However, our model
predicts there are "information production wars." Since information production is unobservable,
we can not follow the usual empirical strategy. We propose a new method for testing the model,
which we believe to be of independent interest. Our approach tests a general implication of any
equilibrium of the model with imperfect competition by identifying the relevant public information
and its relation with "information production wars"—credit crunches. In theory, to detect deviations
by rivals, banks must look at two sources of public information: the number of loans made in a
period by each rival and the default performance of each rivals’ loan portfolio. We argue that
the relative performance of other banks is the public information relevant for each bank’s decisions
about the choice of the level of information production. More importantly, the use of relative
bank performance empirically distinguishes our theory from a general learning story, which would
predict past bank performance matters for bank credit decisions.
Broadly, the empirical analysis is in three parts. First, we examine a narrow category of loans,
U.S. credit card lending, where there are a small number of banks that appear to dominate the
market. Since it is not clear which banks are rivals, we ﬁrst analyze this lending market by
examining banks pairwise. If the PDI increases, banks should reduce their lending and increase
their information production resulting in fewer loan losses in the next quarter. We also examine
bank proﬁtability, using stock returns. Second, we analyze macroeconomic time series, including
the Lending Standard Survey Index. We form an aggregate bank Performance Diﬀerence Index
(PDI) based on the absolute value of the diﬀerences on all commercial and industrial loans of
the largest 200 banks. If beliefs are, in fact, based on this information, then we should be able
to explain (in the sense of Granger causality) the time series of Fed’s Lending Standard Survey
responses (the percentage of banks reporting "tightening" their standards) in Lown and Morgan
(2001). Thirdly, if credit crunches are endogenous, and a systematic risk, then they should be a
priced factor in an asset pricing model of stock returns. Therefore, our ﬁnal test is to ask whether
the parameterization of banks’ relevant histories is a priced risk factor in a four factor Fama-French
asset pricing setting. We look at banks and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms by size, as credit crunches have
larger eﬀects on smaller ﬁrms. We ﬁnd all the evidence to be consistent with the theory.
Other relevant work includes Rajan (1994). He argues that ﬂuctuations in credit availability by
3banks are driven by bank managers’ concerns for their reputations (due to bank managers having
short horizons), and that consequently bank managers are inﬂuenced by the credit policies of other
banks. Managers’ reputations suﬀer if they fail to expand credit while other banks are doing so,
implying that expansions lead to signiﬁcant increases in losses on loans subsequently.9 We test
Rajan’s idea in the empirical section. Two related theoretical models are provided by Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2004) and Ruckes (2003). These papers show a link between lending standards
and information asymmetry among banks, driven by exogenous changes in the macroeconomy.
As distinct from these models, the ﬂuctuation of banks’ lending behavior in our paper is purely
driven by the strategic interactions between banks instead of an exogenously changing economic
environment.
We proceed in Section 2 to describe the stage game for bank lending competition, and we study
the existence of stage Nash equilibrium and the model’s implications for lending standards. The
stage game is a prelude to considering the inﬁnitely repeated game, the subject of Section 3. In
Section 4, we carry out empirical tests. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Lending Market Stage Game
In this section we set forth the model and analyze the lending market stage game.
Suppose (without loss of generality) that there are two banks in the market competing to lend,
as follows. There are N potential borrowers in the credit market. Each of the potential borrowers
is one of two types, good or bad. Good types’ projects succeed with probability pg, and bad types’
projects succeed with probability pb, where pg > pb ≥ 0. Potential borrowers, sometimes also
referred to below as “applicants,” do not know their own type. At the beginning of the period
potential borrowers apply simultaneously to each bank for a loan. There is no application fee. The
probability of an applicant being a bad type is λ, which is common knowledge.10 Each applicant
can accept at most one loan oﬀer, and if a loan is granted, the borrower invests in a one period
project which will yield a return of X < ∞ if the project succeeds and returns 0 otherwise. A
borrower whose project succeeds will use the return X to repay the loan, i.e., a borrower’s realized
cash ﬂow is veriﬁable.
Banks are risk-neutral. They can raise funds at some interest rate, assumed to be zero. After
receiving the loan applications, a bank can use a costly technology to produce information about
the applicant’s type. The credit worthiness testing results in determining the type of an applicant,
but there is a per applicant cost of c > 0. Banks can test any proportion of their applicants. Let
9However, as pointed out by Weinberg (1995), the data on the growth rate of total loans and loan charge-oﬀs in
the United States from 1950 to 1992 do not show the pattern of increases in the amount of lending being followed by
increases in loan losses.
10We will hold λ ﬁxed throughout the analysis, but this is to clarify the mechanism that is our focus. It is natural
to think of λ as being time-varying, representing other business cycle shocks outside the model, and we could easily
incorporate this. But it would obscure the cyclical eﬀects that are purely due to bank competition.
4ni denote the number of applicants that are tested by bank i. We say that the more applicants
that a bank tests, i.e., using the costly information production technology, the higher are its credit
or lending standards.11 If a bank switches from not using the credit worthiness test to using it, we
say that the bank has raised its lending or credit standards. We assume that neither bank observes
the other bank’s credit standards, i.e., each bank is unaware of how many applicants the other bank
tests. Results of the tests are the private information of the testing bank.
Since the bank borrowing rate is zero, when a bank charges F (to be repaid at the end of
the period) for one unit of loan, the bank’s expected return from lending to an applicant will be
λpbF + (1 − λ)pgF − 1 in the case of no credit worthiness testing.
• Assumption 1: pgX > 1, pbX < 1, and λpbX + (1 − λ)pgX > 1.
Assumption 1 means that there exists some interest rate, X, that allows a bank to earn positive
proﬁts from lending to a good type project ex ante, but there does not exist an interest rate at
which a bank can make positive proﬁts from lending to a bad type project ex ante. (Given the
loan size being normalized to 1, the face value of the loan F uniquely determines the interest rate,
and later on we refer to F as the “loan interest rate.”) It is also possible for banks to proﬁt from
lending to both types of applicants without discriminating between the types.
Each bank ﬁrst chooses some (could be zero, could be all) applicants to test, then, depending
on the test results, decides whether to make a loan oﬀer for each applicant, and if yes, at what
interest rate. We formally deﬁne the stage strategy of each bank in Appendix 1.
We assume that banks do not observe each other’s interest rates or the identities of applicants
oﬀered loans. At the end of the period only ﬁnal loan portfolio sizes and outcomes are publicly
observable. Banks cannot communicate with each other.
Figure 1 shows the timing of moves in the one period game.
2.1 Stage Nash Equilibrium
We now turn to study Nash equilibrium, and the conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium,
in the lending market stage game. We provide a condition under which the only Nash equilibrium
that exists is one in which neither bank conducts credit worthiness testing and both banks earn
zero proﬁts.
First we will study the Nash equilibrium in which no bank conducts credit worthiness testing.
We have the following results.
Proposition 1 If and only if c ≥
λ(1−λ)(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg , there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which
no bank conducts credit worthiness testing and both banks earn zero proﬁts.
11Imagine that banks always produce some minimal amount of information about loan applicants. We ignore
this base amount of information, however, and focus only on the situation where banks choose to produce more
information than this base level. So, we interpret the credit worthiness test as the additional information produced,
beyond the normal information production.
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Figure 1: The Timing of the Stage Game
The proof is in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 says that if the cost of testing each loan applicant is suﬃciently high, i.e., c ≥
λ(1−λ)(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg , then the there exists a Nash equilibrium in which no bank conducts credit worthiness
testing and neither bank earns positive proﬁts.
• Assumption 2: c ≥
λ(1−λ)(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg .
Assumption 2 guarantees the existence of the stage symmetric Nash equilibrium. At the same
time, this assumption implies that the optimal payoﬀs for the banks are reached when no credit
worthiness testing are conducted (as we will show in a moment).
Now consider the case where both banks test at least some applicants.
Proposition 2 There is no symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both banks test at least some of
the applicants.
The proof is in Appendix 2.12 Intuitively, after the banks test some of the applicants, they will
compete with each other for the good type applicants, which will drive the post-test proﬁt to zero.
However, since there is a test cost, ex-ante the banks’ proﬁts will be negative.
Our conclusion with regard to the stage game in the lending market is that, without mixed
strategies, the only Nash equilibrium that exists is the equilibrium in which neither bank conducts
credit worthiness testing, and both banks earn zero proﬁts.
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal payoﬀs that the two banks receive in the stage
game. If a bank does not conduct credit worthiness testing on an individual applicant and charges
12Banks could play more general mixed strategies. For example, banks could mix between testing n1 applicants
and testing n2 applicants. We do not delve into these strategies.
6F, then the expected payoﬀ from a loan to that individual applicant is:
π = λpbF + (1 − λ)pgF − 1,
which is maximized at F = X. If a bank conducts credit worthiness testing on an individual
applicant and charges F, then the expected payoﬀ from a loan to that individual applicant is:
π′ = (1 − λ)(pgF − 1) − c,
which also is maximized at, say, F = X. It is easy to check that π′ < π with F = X under
Assumption 2.
3 Repeated Competition
In the stage game, we have already shown that banks earn zero proﬁts without testing, and the
optimal payoﬀs for banks are reached when there is no costly credit worthiness test being used.
Setting a (collusive) loan interest rate of F = X would be the most proﬁtable case for both banks.
In repeated competition banks will try to collude to charge F = X without conducting credit
worthiness testing. When the banks collude by oﬀering a proﬁtable interest rate to the applicants
without testing, there is an incentive for each bank to undercut the interest rate in order to get more
applicants. In order to generate intertemporal incentives to support the collusion on a high interest
rate, banks need to punish each other to prevent deviation in undercutting interest rates, which
can be monitored by looking at the loan portfolio size of each bank. However, a high interest rate
generates incentives for banks to conduct credit worthiness testing and get higher quality applicants
while manipulating the loan portfolio size. To see this, let us look at the following example.
By undercutting the interest rate oﬀered to an applicant without credit worthiness testing, the
expected payoﬀ from this loan to the bank is:
π = λpbF + (1 − λ)pgF − 1.
Alternatively, the bank can test the applicant, undercut the interest rate if it is a good type, and
undercut the interest rate to another untested applicant if the tested one turns out to be a bad
type (this way the bank always gets one applicant for sure); the expected payoﬀ to the bank is:
π′ = λ[λpbF + (1 − λ)pgF − 1] + (1 − λ)(pgF − 1) − c.
We can show:
π′ − π = λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)F − c,
which is increasing with F. Therefore, when F is high enough, banks will have incentive to produce
information while manipulating the loan portfolio size through interest rates.
Formally, we consider sequential equilibria in which banks’ strategies will depend on public
information. In general, banks can base their strategies on all available information, both public
7and private. However, if one bank’s strategy only depends on public information, the other bank
can not do better by making its strategy dependent on both public information and its private
information. The class of sequential equilibria (see Kreps and Wilson (1982)) that depends only
on public information is called “Perfect Public Equilibria” (PPE). See Fudenberg, Levine, and
Maskin (1994). The available public information at the end of each period is the number of loans
that each bank made (Dit) and the number of those loans that defaulted (χit).
We formalize the game in Appendix 1, and we restrict attention to symmetric PPE (SPPE)
(deﬁned below). Aside from seeing how the repeated game works, the main point is the demon-
stration that because banks have two actions that they can use to compete (i.e., changing lending
rates and increasing information production), banks’ beliefs must be based on the history of banks’
portfolio sizes as well as banks’ loan default performances.
3.1 Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium
We now examine symmetric PPE (SPPE) in which asymmetric play is allowed after the ﬁrst period
stage game is played symmetrically.13 We focus on demonstrating that the banks’ continuation
play depends on the history of the number of loans made by each bank and on the number of loan
defaults in each bank’s portfolio. These results then motivate the empirical analysis.
Any perfect public equilibrium payoﬀ for bank i can, as discussed in Appendix 1, be factored into
a ﬁrst-period stage payoﬀ πi (depending on the stage strategies of both banks) and a continuation
payoﬀ function ui (depending on the public history). Let si be the stage strategy for bank i, an
SPPE is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: A Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium (SPPE) is a Perfect Public Equilib-
rium that can be decomposed into the ﬁrst period stage strategies and continuation value functions
(s1,s2,u1,u2) such that:
s1 = s2 and u1(D1,D2,χ1,χ2) = u2(D2,D1,χ2,χ1).
According to the deﬁnition, the stage game strategies are the same, but the continuation strate-
gies can diﬀer. In particular, note that the continuation value functions for Bank 1 and Bank 2 are
symmetric in that if we exchange the loan portfolio sizes and loan performances, the continuation
values will also be exchanged. In such an SPPE, the expected payoﬀ for the two banks are the
same, but asymmetric play is allowed after the ﬁrst period, for asymmetric realizations of loan
portfolio size and loan performance.
At a proﬁtable interest rate, if a bank makes more loans than its rival, then the continuation
value of Bank 1 should be lower, to eliminate the incentive of the banks to deviate by undercutting
interest rates to get more loans. However, when there is credit worthiness testing, it may not
13We can prove that there does not exist any symmetric PPE in a strict sense (i.e., both banks behave the same
way in the stage game and in the continuation game) other than the one in which the stage Nash equilibrium is
played every period. The proof is available on request.
8be true that making more loans is always better. A bank can deviate by testing, “raising credit
standards,” resulting in the other bank lending to the bad type applicants rejected by the ﬁrst
bank. This is the strategic use of the winner’s curse by one bank against its rival. Due to that
possibility, we will show that loan performance (number of defaults in each bank portfolio) will also
aﬀect the continuation value.
Proposition 3 In any SPPE, in which neither bank tests any applicant and both banks make loan
oﬀers to all applicants at the same interest rate Fα, if c < λ(1−λ)(pg−pb)Fα, then the continuation
value functions cannot only depend on the number of loans made by each bank.
The proof is in Appendix 2. The proof involves ﬁnding a deviating strategy such that the
expected continuation payoﬀs are the same for both banks while there is a stage gain by conducting
credit worthiness testing. The proposition says that banks’ loan performances (i.e., number of
defaults) matters in an SPPE with banks charging the same interest rate (high enough) to all the
applicants and conducting no credit worthiness testing. With the possibility of credit worthiness
testing, variation in loan portfolio sizes is not enough to detect deviation through credit worthiness
testing. The case with both banks oﬀering loans to only a subset of the applicants without using
the test is covered in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In any SPPE, in which neither bank tests any applicant and in which each bank
makes loan oﬀers to a subset 2 ≤ Nα < N of applicants at the same interest rate Fα, if c <
λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)Fα, then the continuation value functions cannot only depend on the number of
loans made by each bank.
The proof is in Appendix 2. The case with Nα = 1 is covered by the next corollary.
Corollary 2 In any SPPE, in which neither bank tests any applicant and in which each bank makes
loan oﬀers to a subset Nα ≤ N of applicants at diﬀerent interest rates, denoted by a vector Fα, if
c < 2N−1
2N λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)min{Fα}, then the continuation value functions cannot only depend on
the number of loans made by each bank.
The proof is in Appendix 2.
The conclusion is that when the banks want to avoid costly credit worthiness testing on the
equilibrium path, then it is not possible for the two banks to collude on a high loan interest rate in
a SPPE without looking at each other’s loan performances. The possibility of deviating by using
credit worthiness testing while manipulating the loan size, and the resulting winner’s curse eﬀect,
makes both banks’ strategies sensitive to each others’ past loan performances, even though there
is an i.i.d. distribution of borrower types over time.
As we have shown, banks’ strategies depend on the public histories of banks’ loan portfolio
performance and size. However, the theory does not provide details on how the public histories are
linked to bank beliefs and strategies. To help understand this issue for later empirical tests, let us
9consider a simple example with N = 2 applicants. Suppose Bank 1 deviates from the equilibrium
strategy s (test no applicants, and oﬀer some high interest rate Fα to both of them) to s′ as follows:
test one applicant; if he is good, oﬀer a loan at rate F−
α , and reject the other applicant; if the
applicant is bad, reject it, and oﬀer a loan to the other applicant at loan rate F−
α . In this way, the
expected loan portfolio size is not changed, but loan performance will be improved; there is less
likely to be a default. Given the loan distribution (D1 = 1,D2 = 1), from Bank 2’s point of view,
without deviation by Bank 1, the probability of Bank 2 having a loan default is:
q = λ(1 − pb) + (1 − λ)(1 − pg).
With Bank 1 deviating to s′, Bank 2’s default probability becomes:
q′ = λ(1 − pb) + (1 − λ)[λ(1 − pb) + (1 − λ)(1 − pg)].
The likelihood of default is higher:
∆q = q′ − q = λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb) > 0.
To detect a deviation, however, banks should compare their results. That is, they should check
their loan performance diﬀerence. Given the loan distribution (D1 = 1,D2 = 1), without deviation
by Bank 1, the probability of Bank 2 having a worse performance than Bank 1 is:
qr = λ(1 − pb)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg] + (1 − λ)(1 − pg)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg] < q.
With Bank 1 deviating to s′, this probability becomes:
q′
r = λ(1 − pb)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg] + (1 − λ)[λ(1 − pb) + (1 − λ)(1 − pg)]pg.
We have:
∆qr = q′
r − qr = λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb) = ∆q.
Therefore, compared with punishing each other after a bad performance, doing that after a relatively
bad performance incurs a smaller probability of a mistaken punishment (qr < q), while it generates
the same incentive to not to deviate (∆qr = ∆q). The measure of the "performance diﬀerence"
excludes the case where both banks perform poorly, and excluding this case is empirically important
because it can result from aggregate shocks, which we do not model.
In Appendix 3, we construct a detailed example, using a Green-Porter (1984) type trigger
strategy, in which banks change their lending standards based on the history of their performance
diﬀerences.
Before we start our empirical section, let us brieﬂy discuss the link between information pro-
duction and credit crunches. When each bank tests a subset of the applicant pool, the winner’s
curse eﬀect may lead the banks to reject all those non-tested applicants. To see this, assume the
banks randomly pick n < N applicants for testing, and oﬀers loans to those that pass the test. To
10simplify the argument, assume that the interest rates oﬀered to non-tested applicants are higher
than the one oﬀered to applicants that passed the test. For the non-tested applicants, it is possible
that there does not exist a proﬁtable interest rate due to the winner’s curse. If a bank oﬀers loans
to non-tested applicants, then given an oﬀer is accepted by an applicant, the probability of this
non-tested applicant being a bad type is:
θ . = Pr(bad type|not tested) =
n








When n is close to N, θ can be very close to 1. When banks conduct credit worthiness testing,
lending standards (loosely deﬁned) can aﬀect lending in two ways. First, those applicants that were
tested can be rejected if banks ﬁnd them to be bad types; second, those applicants that were not
tested can be rejected if the proportion of applicants that are tested is large. The second "rejected"
category might contain some good type applicants. Therefore, some non-tested applicants can not
get loans if both banks test a large portion of all applicants. This is a "credit crunch" in which
applicants not tested by either bank are denied loans, even if they are in fact good types.
The above discussions lead to our empirical tests in the next section: banks’ relative performance
are important for the credit cycles, which have signiﬁcant impact on the economy.
4 Empirical Tests
The model proposes that banks form beliefs based on public information. The empirical strategy
we adopt is to focus on one robust prediction that the theory puts forward, namely, that unlike a
perfectly competitive lending market, in the imperfectly competitive lending market that we have
described, public histories about rival banks should aﬀect the decisions of any given bank. We
construct measures of the relative performance histories of banks, variables that are at the root
of beliefs and their formation. In particular, changes in beliefs about rival behavior should be a
function of bank public performance diﬀerences.
In the U.S. the most important public information available about bank performance is the in-
formation collected by bank regulatory authorities (the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of Currency) in the quarterly Call Reports. While
publicly-traded banks also ﬁle with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Call Reports
provide the detail on speciﬁc loan category amounts outstanding, charge-oﬀs, and losses. We
construct Performance Diﬀerence Indices based on the Call Reports that U.S. banks ﬁle quarterly
with. These reports are ﬁled by banks within 30 days after the last business day of the quarter,
and become public roughly 25 to 30 days later.14 For that reason, when we analyze the predictive
14Today banks submit their Call Reports electronically to Electronic Data Systems Corporation. It is then sent to
the Federal Reserve Board and to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which subsequently release the data.
This has of course changed over time. Nowadays, the information is available 25-30 days after it is ﬁled on the web.
Earlier private information providers would obtain computer tapes of the information from the National Technical
11power of certain variables to be constructed based on the Call Reports, we use the one period lag
when the contemporaneous variable is needed. Because the reports appear at a quarterly frequency,
we analyze data at that frequency.
To parameterize the relative bank performance for our empirical studies, we use the absolute
value of performance diﬀerences. Taking the absolute value is motivated by the theory. Even
if a bank is doing relatively better than its rivals, it knows that if rivals believe that it has devi-
ated then they will increase their information production, causing the better performing bank to
also raise its information production. Banks, whether relatively better performing or relatively
worse performing, punish simultaneously, resulting in the credit crunch. If banks’ beliefs about
rivals’ actions change based on our parameterization of the public history, then when this measure
increases, i.e., when there is a greater dispersion of relative performance, then banks reduce their
lending and increase its quality, resulting in fewer loans, lower loss ratios, and reduced proﬁtability
in the future. We construct indices of the absolute value of the diﬀerence in loan loss ratios and
test whether the histories of such variables have predictive power for future lending decisions, loan
losses, and bank stock returns.
Another challenge for testing concerns identifying rival banks. We must identify banks that
are, in fact, rivals in a lending market. It is not clear whether banks compete with each other in
all lending activities or only in some specialized lending areas. It is also not clear whether bank
competition is a function of geography or possibly bank size. These are empirical issues.
While the model suggests that there are two "regimes," normal times and punishment times,
this is an artifact of simplifying the model. There could be a range of punishments, making the
notion of a "regime" less discontinuous. This too is an empirical issue.
4.1 The Credit Card Loan Market
We ﬁrst examine a speciﬁc, but important category of loans, credit card loans.15 In the U.S. credit
card lending market potential rival banks are identiﬁable because credit card lending is highly
concentrated and this concentration has been persistent. The Federal Reserve has collected data
on credit card lending and related charge-oﬀs since the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 in the Call Reports.
The data we use is at the bank holding company level, as aggregated by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago. Thus, we are thinking of banks competing at the holding company level rather than at
the individual bank level. For each bank holding company, we collect quarterly data from 1991.I
through 2000.IV for “Credit Cards and Related Plans,” as well as some other variables discussed
Information Service of the Department of Commerce. The information was then provided in published formats. We
thank Mary West of the Federal Reserve Board for information on the timing of the reports.
15Despite the public availability of credit scores on individual consumers, banks retain important private information
about credit card borrowers. Gross and Souleles (2002) show the additional explanatory power of private internal
bank information in predicting consumer defaults on credit card accounts, using a sample where they were able to






Figure 2: Herﬁndahl Index
below.16
The high concentration is shown by the Herﬁndahl Index for banks that are active in the credit
card loan market pictured in Figure 2.17 Figure 3 shows the proportion of credit card loans for
the top 10, 30, and 50 bank holding companies. We can see from Figures 2 and 3 that over time
the credit card loan market has become increasingly concentrated, and the market shares of the
top bank holding companies have become increasingly larger.
4.1.1 Data Description
The basic idea of the ﬁrst set of tests is to regress an individual bank’s credit card loans outstanding,
normalized by total loans or total assets, or the bank’s (normalized) credit card loss rate, on lagged
variables that we hypothesize predict the bank’s decision to make more credit card loans or to reduce
losses on credit card loans (by making fewer loans or more high quality loans). Macroeconomic
variables that characterize the state of the business cycle are one set of predictors. Lagged measures
of the bank’s own performance in the credit card market are another set of predictors. The key
variables are measures of rival banks’ relative histories that we hypothesize are the basis for each
bank’s beliefs about whether rivals have deviated. Our hypothesis is that these measures of bank
histories will be signiﬁcantly negative, even conditional on all the other variables.
In addition to collecting the quarterly bank holding company data from 1991.I to 2000.IV for
“Credit Cards and Related Plans(CLS),” we also use “Charge-oﬀs on Loans to Individuals for
Household, Family, and Other Personal Expenditure — Credit Cards and Related Plans (CCO),”
16The data are not reported more frequently than quarterly.
17A Herﬁndahl Index is constructed as
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Figure 3: Shares of Top Bank Holding Companies in Credit Card Loan Market
“Recoveries on Loans to Individuals for Household, Family, and Other Personal Expenditures —
Credit Cards and Related Plans (CRV ),” and “Total Loans and Leases, Net (TLS).” We construct
the following variables:
Credit Card Loan Loss Rate (CLL) =
CCO − CRV
CLS




Each variable is constructed for each bank holding company for each quarter.18
With respect to macroeconomic data we use quarterly macroeconomic data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St.Louis for the period 1991.I to 2000.IV : “Civilian Unemployment Rate, Percent,
Seasonally Adjusted (UMP),” “Real Disposable Personal Income, Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars,
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (DPI),” “Federal Funds Rate, Averages of Daily Figures, Percent
(FFR).”19
4.1.2 Pairwise Tests of Rival Banks
We ﬁrst look at banks pairwise. We do this for two reasons. First, it is not known which banks are
rivals, and maybe not all banks are rivals. Second, we have only 40 quarterly observations for each
bank, so examining several banks jointly quickly uses up the degrees of freedom. We focus on the
18We also collect data for “Total Assets (ASSET),” and costruct the variable: Credit Card Loans to Total Assets
Ratio (CRA) = CLS
ASSET . The main regression results using CRA are similar to those using CRL. Thus we ommit
the results for the sake of space.
19We collected the monthly data for the Unemployment Rate (UMP), Disposable Income (DPI), Federal Funds
Rate (FFR), and calculated the three-month averages to get the quarterly data. Also, DPI is normalized by GDP.
14largest six bank holding companies, which constantly remain within the top 20 in credit card loan
portfolio size during the period 1991.I to 2000.IV . These six banks are: Citicorp, New York, NY
(CITI); Bank One Corp., Chicago, IL (BONE); MBNA Corp., Wilmington, DE (MBNA); Bank of
America, Charlotte, NC (BOAM); Chase Manhattan Corp., New York, NY (CHAS); and Wachovia
Corp.,Winston-Salem, NC (WACH).
In general, we run the following regression for each bank holding company i:
yit = αijxt + βijwit + γijzijt + εit, for j  = i (1)
where




and αij, βij, and γij are the coeﬃcients for x, w, and z, respectively. C is the constant term, T
is the time trend, S1 is the seasonal dummy for ﬁrst quarter, S2 is the seasonal dummy for second
quarter, and S3 is the seasonal dummy for third quarter. We do not include lags of DPIt, FFRt,
or UMPt because the main results are not aﬀected by adding them. Since some bank holding
companies might have systematically higher (or lower) loan loss rates than another bank holding
companies, we ﬁrst take out the mean from each CLLi, and then take the diﬀerence to get ∆CLLji.
In this way, |∆CLLji| reﬂects the relative performance of the two banks.
|∆CLLji| is the key variable. It is a particular parametrization of the relevant public infor-
mation: the performance diﬀerence. This variable is lagged to be consistent with the fact the
Call Report information is publicly available with a lag. For the current quarter, the most recent
public information would be about last quarter. Conditional on the state of the macroeconomy
and bank holding company i’s own past performance, we ask whether bank holding company i’s
lending decisions depend on the observed absolute value of the diﬀerences between it’s own past
performance and that of its rival, bank holding company j. For each measure of the relative dif-
ference in loan performance, we test whether γ = 0, using a Wald test (chi-squared distribution).
The results are shown in Table 1.20
In Table 1, we report the average value of the coeﬃcients of zij, and the p-value (in parenthesis)
of the Wald test (χ2(4)). Signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients are marked by ‘∗,’ and signiﬁcant positive
coeﬃcients are marked by ‘#.’ Most coeﬃcients are negative, which matches the theoretical
prediction. When the diﬀerence between the loan performance history is large, it leads to (an
increase in lending standards and, consequently) a subsequent decrease in (lower quality) loans
20The result in entry (i,j) in the table comes from the regression of bank i’s loan loss ratio (or asset allocation) as
the dependent variable.
















































































































































Table 1: Results for Pairwise Regressions
16and a consequent reduction in loan losses. Many negative coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant (indicated by
*** for the 1% level, by ** for the 5% level, and by * for the 10% level, and similarly for positive
coeﬃcients). Also, we can observe a systematic pattern of competition between Citicorp, Bank
One, and Wachovia; the credit card loan loss and credit card loan size (relative to total loans or
total assets) for these banks signiﬁcantly depend on the relative performance of each other.
The above results have a problem that we do not know how many signiﬁcant chi-squared
statistics would be expected to be signiﬁcant in a small sample. We address this issue using a
bootstrap (see Horowitz (2001) for a survey). We bootstrap to test if the results in Table 1 can
verify our conjecture that the measures of bank holding companies’ loan performance aﬀect each
other’s loan decisions. The Null hypothesis is that a bank holding company’s loan decision only
depends on the aggregate economic variables and its own past loan performance, i.e.:
H0 : yit = αixt + βiwit + uit.
The alternative hypothesis comes from the pairwise regression for each bank holding company
i and bank holding company j  = i:
H1 : yit = αijxit + βijwit + γijzijt + εit, with γij < 0.
In order to test the Null hypothesis, we use the bootstrap to obtain an approximation to the
distribution of a Signiﬁcance Index, SI, deﬁned below, and then ﬁnd the p-value of SI∗ (the
Signiﬁcance Index from the pairwise regressions using the original data). For each round of the
bootstrap, the Signiﬁcance Index is constructed as follows. For each of the 30 pairwise regressions,
when the average coeﬃcient of zijt is negative, if the chi—squared-statistic is signiﬁcant at the 99%
conﬁdence level, add a value of 4 to SI, if it is signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level , add a value
of 3 to SI, if it is only signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level, add a value of 2 to SI, and add
a value of 1 otherwise; when the average coeﬃcient of zijt is negative, if the chi—squared-statistic
is signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level, add a value of −4 to SI, if it is signiﬁcant at the 95%
conﬁdence level , add a value of −3 to SI, if it is only signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level, add
a value of −2 to SI, and add a value of −1 otherwise.21 The index SI takes care of both the
signiﬁcance and the sign of the coeﬃcients of zijt. If the p-value of SI∗ is small enough, we can
reject the Null hypothesis.
The bootstrap algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: Run the OLS regression yit = αixt +βiwit +uit, for the three cases where yit = CLLit
or CRLit, and use the estimated coeﬃcients,   αOLS and   βOLS, to generate the residuals u∗
it.
Step 2: By hypothesis, the residuals u∗




it =   αCLLixt +   βCLLiwit + u∗
CLLit. This creates new w∗
it and z∗
ijt, which are
necessary since zijt and some of the wit variables are lags of CLLi and CLLj.
21Admittedly there is some arbitrariness in how the Signiﬁcance Index is constructed. However, we tried con-




Table 2: Bootstrap Results
Step 3: Use u∗
it , for yit = CRLit, to generate new CRL∗
it using CRL∗














and calculate the Signiﬁcant Index SI.
Step 5: Repeat Step 2 to Step 4 10,000 times, and obtain the distribution of SI.
Step 6: Calculate the p-value of SI∗, i.e. Pr(SI ≥ SI∗).
The results are reported in Table 2. The sample Signiﬁcance Indices are: SI∗
CLL = 34 and
SI∗
CRL = 36. The p-values are presented in Table 2.
We conclude that the Null hypothesis is rejected.
4.1.3 Threshold Eﬀects
A literal interpretation of the model would mean that there are two "regimes," rather than a
possible large number of levels of intensity of information production. Perhaps there is a threshold
eﬀect, in that only if the absolute performance diﬀerences reach a certain critical level does (mutual)
punishment occur. We investigate this by specifying a diﬀerent measure of the absolute diﬀerence
as shown in the model below. For each bank i, deﬁne y1
it = CLLit, and y2
it = CRLit, and write








ij) for j  = i,
and zijt = max{0,|CLLit − CLLjt| − THij}.
The new zijt measures the value of performance diﬀerence, measured by |CLLit − CLLjt|, in
excess of certain threshold, THij, which does not change over time or across k, and which is to be
estimated. For each pair of banks, (i,j), we estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood:
{  αk
ij,   βk
ij,   γk




















We proceed as above by for each pair of banks (omitted here) and then bootstrapping. The
ﬁnal p-value results are shown in Table 3.
The threshold eﬀects are signiﬁcant with the newly constructed beliefs variables, zijt, though








Table 4: Boostrap Results in the Presence of Learning Eﬀects
4.1.4 Learning as an Alternative Hypothesis
Could the above results be explained by some sort of learning? That is, an alternative explanation
is that banks learn about underlying the economic conditions from other banks’ loan performance.
Perhaps this learning eﬀect is also captured by the |∆CLLji| variable that we constructed. It
would seem that learning should not be based on absolute diﬀerences in bank performance, but on
the level of other banks’ performances as well as the bank’s own performance history. To examine
this possibility we add lags of CLLj in the regression of Bank i. Therefore, in the regression
equation (1), we replace wit with wijt:
wijt = (CLLit−1,CLLit−2,CLLit−3,CLLit−4,CLLjt−1,CLLjt−2,CLLjt−3,CLLjt−4).
The tables showing the estimated coeﬃcient on the absolute performance diﬀerence coeﬃcients
are omitted for the sake of space. The main results are similar to Table 1. The same pattern
of competition between Citicorp, Bank One, and Wachovia appears, as in Table 1. The results
involving other banks are mixed.





it, , i.e., with the lags of LLj
included in the regression in credit card loan part. The null hypothesis is still:
H0 : yit = αixt + βiwit + uit.
with yit, xt and wit deﬁned in 2.
The sample Signiﬁcant Indices are: SI∗
CLL = 36 and SI∗
CRL = 28. The p-values are presented
in Table 4.
The information contained in the absolute diﬀerence variables remain signiﬁcant, in the presence
of the most general speciﬁcation of learning.
4.1.5 An Aggregate Performance Diﬀerence Index
Based on the success of the pairwise tests, we move next to analyzing the histories of all relevant
rival credit card lenders jointly. We construct an aggregate Performance Diﬀerence Index (PDI):































Table 5: Results for the Performance Diﬀerence Index
PDIt =
 
i>j |CLLit − CLLjt|
15
.
This Performance Diﬀerence Index measures the average diﬀerence of the competing banks’ loan
performances.22 (The denominator comes from having six banks, leading to ﬁfteen diﬀerent pairs
in total.) For each bank i, we run the following regression:
yit = αixt + βiwit + γizit + uit,
where yit, xt and wit deﬁned in 2, and zit = (PDIt−1,PDIt−2,PDIt−3,PDIt−4). The results are
reported in Table 5.
Table 5 presents the average value of the coeﬃcients of zij and the p-value (in parentheses) of
the Wald test (χ2(4)). Table 5 shows that, aside from MBNA, all the banks have negative and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for PDI, conﬁrming the conjecture from the theory. When there is a large
performance diﬀerence across all the rival banks, banks raise their lending standards to punish each
other, and consequently future loan losses go down. The standard deviation of PDI is 0.00444,
the average coeﬃcients on PDI for CLL and CRL are −0.598 and −1.510, and the mean of CLL
and CRL are 0.0246 and 0.242. When PDI changes by one standard deviation, CLL decreases
by 0.00266 (10% of the mean), and CRL decreases by 0.00671 (3% of the mean). Therefore, the
eﬀects of PDI are also economically important.
22Again, we ﬁrst take out the mean from each CLLi, and then take the diﬀerence.
204.1.6 Rajan’s Reputation Hypothesis
Rajan (1994) argues that reputation considerations of bank managers cause banks to simultaneously
raise their lending standards when there is an aggregate shock to the economy causing the loan
performance of all banks to deteriorate. Banks tend to neglect their own loan performance history
in order to herd or pool with other banks. Rajan’s empirical work focuses on seven New England
banks over the period 1986-1991. His main ﬁnding is that a bank’s loan charge-oﬀs-to-assets ratio
is signiﬁcantly related not only to its own loan loss provisions-to-total assets ratio, but also to
the average charge-oﬀs-to-assets ratio for other banks (instrumented for by the previous quarter’s
charge-oﬀs-to-assets ratio).
In the context here the question is whether our measure of banks’ beliefs about rivals’ credit
standards, the performance diﬀerence index, remains signiﬁcant in the presence of an average or
aggregate credit card loss measure.23 We construct:






and we examine the coeﬃcient on AGLLt−1 in our regressions:
yit = αixt + βiwit + γizt + uit,
where with yit, xt and wit deﬁned in 2, and zt = AGLLt−1.
The coeﬃcients on AGLLt−1 and the associated p-values of t-statistics are reported in Table
6.24
Rajan’s (1994) hypothesis is that an aggregate bad shock leads banks to raise their standards,
so we would expect the coeﬃcients on AGLLt−1 to be signiﬁcantly negative. However, as the
table shows, conditional on other macroeconomic variables, the coeﬃcients of the aggregate loan
loss rate are all positive, with a few exceptions. If we remove the other macroeconomic variables
from the regression, i.e. xt = (C,T,S1,S2,S3), the results are basically the same.
4.1.7 Bank Stock Returns and Performance Diﬀerences
In a credit crunch banks make fewer loans and spend more on information production, so their
proﬁtability declines. In this section, we test that implication of the model. Speciﬁcally, we ask
whether the Performance Diﬀerence Index has predictive power for the stock returns of each top
bank holding company in credit card loans. We collect the stock return from CRSP from 1991.I
to 2000.IV. During this period, Citicorp, Bank of America, and Chase Manhattan are involved
in mergers.25 We carry out the tests for all six bank holding companies and for the three bank
23There are several interpretations of Rajan’s result. For example, the charge-oﬀs of other banks may be informative
about the state of the economy, so their signiﬁcance in the regression is not necessarily evidence in favor of Rajan’s
theory.
24Adding more lags of AGLL basically gives the same results.
25The dates of the M&A activity are: Citigroup,1998.10; Bank of America, 1998.10; and Chase Manhattan in
1996.4.































Table 6: Test of the Reputation Hypothesis
holding companies (Bank One, MBNA, and Wachovia) without merger activity. According to our
theory, after observing large performance diﬀerences between banks, banks will raise their lending
standards (which is costly), and cut lending. Consequently, their proﬁt margins will be lower.
Therefore, we expect to see negative loadings on the lags of the PDI. Note that this is not an asset
pricing model, but a test concerning bank proﬁts, as measured by stock returns. The regression
equations are:
rit = αi + βi1PDIt−1 + βi2PDIt−2 + βi3PDIt−3 + βi4PDIt−4 + εit, i = 1,2,...,6 (or i = 2,3,6).
We use Seemingly Unrelated Regression to estimate the system of equations, with the restriction
that the βis be the same across banks (we allow for diﬀerent intercepts).26
Table 7 shows the Seemingly Unrelated Regression results about the predictive power (on stock
returns) of the PDI for the two cases: six and three bank holding companies. From Table 7, we see
that the PDI from the previous year signiﬁcantly predicts the stock return for the current period.
For the case with six banks, the Wald test of the hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 gives
χ2 = 20.6229, with p-value 0.0004. For the case with three banks, the Wald test of the hypothesis
that β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 gives: χ2 = 10.2850, with p-value 0.0359. Therefore, the PDI
that we constructed does have predictive power for the stock return. Even though we are only
looking at credit cards, keep in mind that these six banks dominate this market, so their proﬁts
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by this sector.27
26In the regressions, we take out the mean and the seasonal eﬀects from the Performance Diﬀerence Index (PDI).
27Since the dividend yield is well known to be a predictor of future stock returns (see, e.g., Cochrane (1999)), we
also include dividend yields in the regressions (using the dividends of each bank from CRSP). The results on the
predictive power of PDI are unchanged with the inclusion of the dividend yield. These results are omitted for the
sake of space.














































Table 7: Results for Stock Return Prediction Using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
4.2 VAR Analysis of the Fed’s Lending Standards Index
In this section we extend the empirical analysis in two important ways. First, we go beyond credit
card lending at six banks to examine commercial and industrial loan market at an aggregate level.
Second, we probe the implications of the theory for macroeconomic dynamics.
If banks increase their information production, that is, they raise their lending standards, then
some borrowers are cut oﬀ from credit — a credit crunch that should have macroeconomic implica-
tions. In this section, we use Vector Autoregressions (VARs) to analyze the aggregate implications
of banks’ loan performance diﬀerences. In contrast to the single equations estimated above, a VAR
system of equations lets us control for the feedback between current and past levels of performance
diﬀerences, the lending standard survey results, and macroeconomic variables. Given estimates of
these interactions, we can identify the impact that unpredictable shocks in performance diﬀerence
public histories have on other variables in the system. We ﬁrst ask whether the performance
diﬀerence histories predict, in the sense of Granger causality, the index of lending standards based
on the Federal Reserve System’s Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices.
We follow Lown and Morgan (2001, 2002) in analyzing the time series of survey responses, the
percentage of banks reporting tightening in the survey. As above, we use quarterly bank loan data
from the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company Database,
which is from the Call Reports. For the period from 1976.1 to 2002.2, we collected Total Loans,
Net of Unearned Income (TL); Loan Loss Allowances (LA). For each bank (holding company) we





We construct the Performance Diﬀerence Index to measure the dispersion of performance across





































Table 8: Results for VAR Analysis
the U.S. banking industry as a whole. To do this, we use the top 200 commercial banks ranked by
total loans, and for each period, we construct the Performance Diﬀerence Index as follows:28
PDI =
 
i>j |LARi − LARj|
19,900
.
Besides the data on the Lending Standards and the Performance Diﬀerence Index, we also collected
data on Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks and Federal Funds Rate.29
As before, we conjecture that this PDI captures the relevant history that is at the basis of
banks’ beliefs about whether other banks are deviating to using the credit worthiness tests.30
4.2.1 VAR Results
The VAR includes four lags of the four endogenous variables: bank lending standards (STAND)
(i.e., the percentage of survey respondents reporting tightening), the Performance Diﬀerence Index
(PDI), the federal funds rates (FFR), and the log of commercial bank loans (LOGLOAN). Bank
lending standards are a loan supply side factor and the federal funds rate aﬀects loan demand;
commercial bank loans are the equilibrium outcomes. The PDI is hypothesized to capture banks’
beliefs, which aﬀect all the other variables. The exogenous variables are a constant, a time trend,
and seasonal dummies for the ﬁrst three quarters of a year. We run the VAR for the period of
1990.II—2001.IV , which is the longest continuous of period where both STAND and PDI have
data.
Table 8 presents the average value of the coeﬃcients and p-values (in parenthesis) of the Wald
test (χ2(4)) of the VAR with four lags of the lending standards, the PDI, log commercial bank loans,
and federal funds rate. Table 8 shows that the PDI Granger-causes all the other three endogenous
28Some banks report the loan loss or loan allowance semi-annually instead of quarterly, so we drop these zero values
in the calculation below. Therefore, the denominator is not necessarily 19,900.
29We ﬁrst collected monthly data, then took the three-month average to obtain quarterly data.
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Response to One S.D. Innovations
Figure 4: Impulse Responses in the Macroeconomy
variables, but not vice versa. An increase in PDI immediately causes a rise in STAND, which
triggers a "recession," and thus leads to a future decrease in the FFR, and a future decrease of
in LOGLOAN (even though the average value of coeﬃcients of PDI for equation LOGLOAN is
positive, the only signiﬁcant one is negative). We observe this pattern in the graph of impulse
responses in Figure 4.31
31The ordering of the variables in a VAR matters for the impulse response functions since the Cholesky decompo-
sitions of the variance-covariance matrix are diﬀerent with diﬀerent orderings (see Hamilton (1994) for more details).
Placing PDI as the second variable in the VAR is a relatively conservative way (in comparison with placing it as the
ﬁrst one) of displaying the eﬀects of PDI.
254.3 Asset Pricing and Credit Crunches
Strategic competition between banks results in periodic credit crunches, a systematic risk. Con-
sequently, if the stock market is eﬃcient, then the stock returns of both banks and non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms, which, at least partially, rely on banks for external ﬁnancing, should reﬂect the competition
between banks. In this section we turn to a diﬀerent empirical approach, namely, we look for the
hypothesized systematic eﬀects in an asset pricing context. If strategic behavior between banks
causes credit cycles, then it causes variation in the proﬁtability of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, which are
aﬀected by credit crunches. At the same time, credit crunches are not proﬁtable for banks. The
credit cycle is a systematic risk, and therefore should be a priced factor in stock returns, to the
extent that this factor is not already spanned by other factors. We conjecture that the constructed
PDI should be a priced risk factor for both banks and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. That is, in the context
of an asset pricing model of stock returns, there should be an additional factor, namely, the Per-
formance Diﬀerence Index. Moreover, since relatively smaller ﬁrms are more dependent on bank
loans (see, e.g., Hancock and Wilcox (1998)), we expect that the coeﬃcients on PDI are larger for
smaller ﬁrms.
We adopt the widely-used Fama-French three factor empirical asset pricing model, augmented
with a momentum factor (as has become common practice).32 The models says that the sensitivity
of a ﬁrm’s expected stock return depends on four factors: the excess return on a broad based market
portfolio, rm − rf; the diﬀerence between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return
on a portfolio of large stocks (small minus large), SMB; the diﬀerence between the return on a
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks
(high minus low), HML; the momentum factor, MOM, is the diﬀerence between the return on a
portfolio of past winners and the return on a portfolio of past losers. To this we add last quarter’s
PDI; the model is estimated using quarterly data, as PDI can only be calculated quarterly.33
We hypothesize that bank stock returns will be sensitive to PDI and that PDI is not spanned
by the other factors. Further, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ stock returns will also be sensitive, increasingly
so for smaller ﬁrms. The monthly ﬁrm returns are collected from CRSP (then transformed into
quarterly data). We separate out commercial banks and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms based on their SIC
codes, and then divide the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms into ten deciles based on the capitalizations. The
data cover the period 1976.I to 2001.IV.
Table 9 reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics of the four factor regression with rm−rf, SMB,
HML, MOM and PDI as the risk factors. The results in Table 9 show that the Performance
Diﬀerence Index (PDI) is a signiﬁcant risk factor for both banks and all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with
32See Fama and French (1993, 1996). Carhart (1997) introduced an additional factor, the momentum factor. We
collect the quarterly Fama-French three factors and monthly momentum factor (then transformed into quarterly
data) from French website (the construction method can also be found there). The risk free rates are three-month
T-Bill rates from FRED II (we use the rate of the ﬁrst month in each quarter) at Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis.
33We use the lag of PDI since there is a lag in the Call Reports becoming publicly available, as we discussed earlier.
We take out the mean from PDI, which does not aﬀect the estimation of β.
































































































































































Table 9: Results for Risk-Factor Analysis
27diﬀerent sizes. Note that the coeﬃcients on PDI for smaller ﬁrms are larger, thus conﬁrming our
conjectures. The standard deviation of PDI is 0.00133. Therefore, when PDI changes by one
standard deviation, the excess return for banks and large non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms changes by about
50 basis points, while the excess return for small non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms changes by about 100 basis
points. We conclude that the competition and collusion among banks is an important risk factor
for stock returns. The size eﬀect further demonstrates that the Performance Diﬀerence Index we
constructed is not capturing some sort of learning eﬀect about macroeconomic condition, which
would be spanned by the other risk factors, or at least would have been priced approximately
equally for both large ﬁrms and small ﬁrms (as rm − rf is).
5 Conclusion
An important message of Green and Porter (1984) is that collusion can be very subtle. The
subsequent empirical work focused on price wars as possible dramatic examples of such imperfect
competition. We studied banking, an industry in which there have not been price wars. Banking
is an industry with limited entry; it is a highly concentrated industry, and it is an industry that
is informationally opaque and hence regulated. The information opaqueness aﬀects competition
for borrowers in that rivals can produce information with diﬀerent precision. This causes the
imperfect competition in banking to take a diﬀerent form from other industries. In particular, we
showed that the intertemporal incentive constraints implementing the collusive arrangement (of
high interest rates and low cost information production) required periodic credit crunches.
Our empirical approach to testing proceeds at the level of the public information that is the
basis for banks’ beliefs, changes in which cause credit cycles. Empirically we showed that a
simple parameterization of relative bank performance diﬀerences has predictive power for rival
banks in the credit card market. Moreover, introducing the performance diﬀerence histories into
a vector autoregression-type macroeconomic model conﬁrms that this is an autonomous source of
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Since changes in bank beliefs based on public information cause credit
cycles, this should be an important independent risk factor for bank stock returns. We showed
that this is indeed the case.
28Appendix 1: The Formal Game
Formalization of the Stage Strategy
Bank i randomly chooses ni applicants to test. For those applicants that bank i does not test,
it will decide to approve applications to Nαi ≤ N − ni of the applicants, and oﬀer the approved
applicants a loan at interest rate Fαi. The bank rejects the rest of the non-tested applicants. For
those applicants that are tested by bank i, the bank will observe a number of good type applicants,
Ngi ≤ ni, and will then decide to approve applications to Nβi ≤ Ngi of the applicants that passed
the test, and oﬀer the approved applicants a loan at interest rate Fβi. Bank i can also decide to
approve applications to Nγi ≤ ni−Ngi of the applicants that failed the test, and oﬀer these approved
applicants a loan at interest rate Fγi. The bank rejects the remaining applicants. In general, Fαi,
Fβi and Fγi could vary among the corresponding category of applicants, i.e., diﬀerent applicants
in the same category could possibly get oﬀers of loans at diﬀerent interest rates. Therefore,
we interpret Fαi, Fβi and Fγi as vectors of interest rates charged to those approved non-tested
applicants.
The stage strategy of a bank is:
si = {ni,Nα(ni,Ngi),Nβ(ni,Ngi),Nγi(ni,Ngi),Fαi(ni,Ngi),Fβi(ni,Ngi),Fγi(ni,Ngi)}, (3)
where:
ni : the number of applicants that bank i tests;
Ngi : the number of good applicants found by bank i with the test;
Nαi : the number of applicants that bank i oﬀers loans to without test;
Nβi : the number of applicants that pass the test and get a loan from bank i;
Nγi : the number of applicants that fail the test and get a loan from bank i;
Fαi : the interest rate on the loan that bank i oﬀers to the applicants without a test;
Fβi : the interest rate on the loan that bank i oﬀers to the applicants that pass the test;
Fγi : the interest rate on the loan that bank i oﬀers to the applicants that fail the test.
Formalization of the Repeated Game
Assume that the two banks play the lending market stage game period after period, each with
the objective of maximizing its expected discounted stream of proﬁts. Upon entering a period of
play, a bank observes only the history of:
(i) its own use of the credit worthiness test and the results;
(ii) its own interest rate on the loan oﬀered to applicants;
(iii) its own choice of applicants that it lent to;
29(iv) its own and its competitor’s loan portfolio size (number of loans made);
(v) its own and its competitor’s number of successful loans.
For bank i, a full path play is an inﬁnite sequence of stage strategies as in (3). The inﬁnite
sequence {sit}∞
t=0, i = 1,2, together with nature’s realization of the number of good type applicants
and the applicants’ rational choice of bank, implies a realized sequence of loans from bank i, as well
as a quality of the borrowers who received loans from bank i. That is:
Kit = (Dαit,Dβit,Dγit,χαit,χβit,χγit),
where D denotes the number of applicants that accepted the oﬀer, and χ denotes the number of
successful borrowers; α, β, and γ denote the corresponding category, as deﬁned earlier (α ≡untested,
approved, applicants; β ≡tested, good types, approved; γ ≡tested, bad types, approved). Deﬁne:
Dit = Dαit + Dβit + Dγit
χit = χαit + χβit + χγit.
Let the public information at the start of period t + 1, be κt = (κ1t,κ2t), where κit = {Dit,χit},
i=1,2 (for each bank). So, the information set includes the realization of the number of loans made
by bank i and the number of borrowers that repaid their loans in period t.




where ait = {nit,Nαit,Nβit,Nγit,Fαit,Fβit,Fγit} is the action of bank i (by convention h−1
i = ∅).
A (pure) strategy for bank i associates a schedule σiT(hT−1
i ) with each T = 0,1,... and σiT:
HT−1
i → S, where S is the stage strategy space with element sit, deﬁned earlier. Denote the
public information as hT−1 = {κt}T−1
t=0 ∈ HT−1, and a (pure) strategy for bank i associates a
schedule σiT(hT−1) with each T = 0,1,... and σiT: HT−1 → S.
Given λ, pg, and pb (i.e., nature’s uncertainty), a strategy proﬁle (σ1,σ2), with σi = {σit(.)}∞
t=0,
i = 1,2, recursively determines a stochastic process of credit standards ({nit}∞
t=0,i = 1,2), interest
rates ({Fit}∞
t=0,i = 1,2), bank portfolio sizes and loan outcomes ({κit}∞
t=0,i = 1,2). The expected






πi(s1t,s2t) = (χαitFit − Dαit) + (χβitFβit − Dβit) + (χγitFit − Dγit) − nitc.
A Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) is a proﬁle of public strategies that, starting at any date
t and given any public history ht−1
i , forms a Nash equilibrium from that point on (see Fudenberg,
Levine, and Maskin (1994)). As noted earlier, a bank cannot do better by playing a non-public
strategy, if the other bank is using a public strategy (i.e., one based on public information). Private
30information about past actions, use of the credit worthiness tests or loan interest rates, do not aﬀect
behavior because such information is not public. We will show that a PPE induces a PPE in every
continuation game.34 We now turn to characterizing the PPEs.
Let ht = κt be the history of realized public information, namely the number of loans made
(loan portfolio size) and the number of defaults (loan performance) for each bank at the end of
each period t. Let V ≡ {v(σ) | σ is an PPE} be the set of PPE payoﬀs. Note that, by the
existence of the stage game Nash equilibrium, V is not empty. To characterize the set of PPE
payoﬀs we will follow Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (APS) (1986, 1990). The basic idea of APS
is that each stage of the repeated lending game can be represented as a static game with payoﬀs
equal to the stage game payoﬀs augmented by continuation payoﬀs, i.e., the present value of the
future payoﬀs. The continuation payoﬀs depend on the current play of the stage game. Because
the loan portfolio sizes and the number of defaults are publicly observed at the end of the period,
the continuation strategy proﬁle is induced by this public information (i.e., a PPE). Therefore, this
proﬁle is common knowledge, and is itself a PPE. The value of the continuation proﬁle is therefore
always in V .
APS deﬁne the notion of “self-generation” to “factor” a PPE into the ﬁrst period payoﬀ and
the continuation payoﬀ, depending on the ﬁrst period outcome. The key to ﬁnding the subgame
perfect sequential equilibrium is the construction of self-generating sets. Intuitively, for a game
with N players, a set W contained in RN is “self-generating” if each value in W can be supported by
continuation values which themselves have values in W. The concept of self-generation is formalized
by the construction of an operator or map T(V ). Suppose that V is the set of all possible payoﬀs
tomorrow. Let T denote the set of payoﬀs today using pure strategies and consistent with Nash
play in the game for some u in V . Deﬁne the operator T(V ) which yields the set of PPE values,
V ∗, as the largest invariant, or “self-generating” set. Denote N as the set of non-negative integers,
and for any V containing (0,0) (the stage Nash payoﬀs), which is the expected payoﬀ from stage
Nash equilibrium, the operator is deﬁned as follows:
T(V ) ≡ {(v1,v2) : ∃(s1,s2) ∈ S × S and (u1,u2) with (u1,u2) : N4 → co(V )
such that : vi = E[πi(s1,s2) + δui(κt)] for i = 1,2
and : vi ≥ E[πi(s′
i,s−i) + δui(κ′
t)] for any s′
i ∈ S and i = 1,2.
This operator factors the supergame into two components: current-period strategies (s1,s2) ∈
S × S and the continuation value (u1,u2) drawn from the convex hull of the set V .35
Lemma 1 The operator T maps compact sets to compact sets.
34A PPE together with any beliefs consistent with Bayes’ rule constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
but a PBE need not be a PPE. See Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) for an example.
35By using the convex hull of V , we are allowing public randomization. Implicitly, we assume that in each period,
there is a lottery that determines which Nash equilibrium will be played next period, as a function of the actions
chosen by the banks this period. The randomization (i.e., the lottery) is public, so this is like having a “sunspot”
31Proof. This follows because the constraints entail weak inequalities, the feasible set is compact,
and the utility and constraint functions are real-valued, continuous and bounded.
This property of T is crucial for applying the methodology of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1986, 1990). In particular, let V0 be compact and contain all feasible, individually rational payoﬀs
(for example, V0 = [0, 1
δN[λpbX + (1 − λ)pgX − 1]] × [0, 1
δN[λpbX + (1 − λ)pgX − 1]]), and deﬁne
Vn+1 = T(Vn), n ≥ 0. Then the deﬁnition of T implies that T(Vn) ⊆ Vn. Using this and the
fact that Vn is nonempty for each n (since repeating stage Nash payoﬀ is always in every Vn),
V ∗ = limn→∞Vn is a nonempty, compact set. Following the arguments in Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990), V ∗ is the largest invariant set of T, and thus is equal to the set of public perfect
equilibrium values of this game.
determine the continuation values. This convexiﬁes the set of equilibrium continuation values. This is a standard
assumption. E.g., see Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994).
32Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If it exists, in any symmetric stage Nash equilibrium in which neither bank conducts
credit worthiness testing, each bank oﬀers loans to all the loan applicants at the same interest rate.
Proof. It is easy to check that if bank i is playing si = (ni = 0,Nαi < N,Fαi), then bank −i
can strictly increase its proﬁts by playing s′
−i = (n−i = 0,N′
α−i = N,F′
α−i), where the strategy
s′
−i is to oﬀer F′
α−i = Fαi to Nαi applicants (although these Nαi applicants might not be the same
applicants that bank i is oﬀering loans to), and oﬀer X to the rest of them.





[λpbF∗ + (1 − λ)pgF∗ − 1] = 0,
and F∗ =
1
λpb + (1 − λ)pg
< X (by Assumption 1).
Assume bank i is playing si = (ni = 0,Nαi = N,Fαi), with Fαi = (F1,F2,...,FN). Suppose
Fj ≥ F∗ for j = 1,2,...,N and assume there exist j and k, such that Fj  = Fk, and, without loss
of generality, Fk > F∗. Bank −i can strictly increase its proﬁtability by playing s′




k ,Fk+1,...,FN) and F−
k is smaller than Fk by an
inﬁnitely small amount. Therefore, interest rates are bid down until each bank oﬀers F∗ to all the
applicants.
Proof. (Proposition 1) From Lemmas 2, we see that in a symmetric equilibrium with no
bank testing applicants, both banks oﬀer loans to all the applicants at F∗ = 1




λpb+(1−λ)pg , a bank will have an incentive to conduct credit worthiness testing on at
least one loan applicant and to oﬀer loans to those applicants that pass the test, oﬀering an interest
rate F∗−, which is lower than F∗ by an inﬁnitely small amount. To see this consider a bank that
deviates by conducting credit worthiness testing on one applicant. The expected proﬁt from this
deviation is:
Eπd
i = (1 − λ)(pgF∗ − 1) − c.
We have:
Eπd
i > 0 iﬀ c < (1 − λ)(pgF∗ − 1) =
(1 − λ)λ(pg − pb)
λpb + (1 − λ)pg
.
We can see that if c ≥
(1−λ)λ(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg , then F∗ will be a Nash equilibrium interest rate on the
loan, and no bank will conduct credit worthiness testing.
Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst prove the following three lemmas.
33Lemma 3 In any symmetric stage Nash equilibrium in which both banks test all the applicants,
each bank oﬀers loans to all the applicants that pass the test at the same interest rate.
The proof is similar to Lemma 2 and is omitted.
Lemma 4 If it exists, in any symmetric stage Nash equilibrium in which both banks test n < N
applicants, each bank oﬀers loans to all applicants that pass the test (good types) at F∗∗ = 1
pg.
The proof is similar to Lemma 2 and is omitted.
Lemma 5 If it exits, in any symmetric stage Nash equilibrium in which both banks test n < N
applicants, each bank either oﬀers loans to all non-tested applicants at the same interest rate or
oﬀers loans to none of them.
Proof. If there exists a feasible F ≤ X such that the banks can make a strictly positive proﬁt
by lending to non-tested applicants at F, following a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma
2, we conclude that each bank oﬀers loans to all non-tested applicants at the same interest rate.
If there does not exist a feasible F such that the banks can make a non-negative proﬁt by
lending to non-tested applicants at F, we conclude that each bank oﬀers loans to none of those
non-tested applicants.36
Proof. (Proposition 2) The proof is by contradiction. If in equilibrium both banks conducting
credit worthiness testing on all the applicants, from Lemmas 3, both banks oﬀer loans to all the
applicants that pass the test, i.e., Nβ = Ng, where Ng denotes the number of applicants passing
the test. Banks will make no loans to bad types found by testing, i.e., Nγ = 0. Both banks use
the credit worthiness test at a cost c per applicant. Assume the loan interest rate they charge to
approved applicants is Fβ(N,Ng), depending on Ng. Each bank must earn non-negative expected
proﬁts Eπ ≥ 0, i.e., the participation constraints. For each realization of Ng, each bank expects
to make loans to 1







kpk[pgFβ(N,k) − 1] − Nc ≥ 0.
Assume now, if bank i cuts Fβ by an inﬁnitely small amount, i.e. Fd
β(Ng) = F−
β (Ng), then it will
loan to Ng applicants for any realization of Ng. We have:
36Here we neglect a non-generic case in which there exists an F such that the banks can earn zero proﬁt by oﬀering
loans to a non-tested applicant, and there does NOT exist an F such that the banks can earn strictly positive proﬁt
by oﬀering loans to a non-tested applicant. In this case, each bank can possibly oﬀer to a subset of the non-tested






β (N,k) − 1] − Nc > Eπi.
For the case in which both banks conducting credit worthiness testing on a subset of the
applicants, if the banks oﬀer loans all non-tested applicants, we have Fβ = F∗∗ and Fα = F(n),
which are the interest rate that results in zero expected proﬁt from oﬀering loans to tested good
type applicants and non-tested applicants when banks test n applicants. It is easy to check that
F(n) > F∗∗. The argument for Fα = F(n) is similar to the argument for Fβ = F∗∗. However,
at Fα = F(n) and Fβ = F∗∗, banks will earn negative expected proﬁt due to the test cost. If
the banks oﬀer loans to none of the non-tested applicants, the banks will only oﬀer loans to those
applicants that passed the test at F∗∗. The argument is similar.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (Proposition 3) The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a SPPE
with s = (n = 0, Nα = N, Fα) played on the equilibrium path, where Fα is a constant larger
than F∗ = 1
λpb+(1−λ)pg, and the continuation value function does not depend on (χ1,χ2), i.e., the
number of defaulted loans in each bank’s loan portfolio.
To eliminate the incentive for a bank to deviate to strategy s′(D) = (n = 0, Nα = D, F−
α ), for
some 0 ≤ D ≤ N, we must have:
E[π1(s′(D),s) + δu1(D,N − D)] = E[π1(s′(D′),s) + δu1(D′,N − D′)], for any D  = D′.
37
Moreover, due to symmetry, it is easy to see that:
δE[u1(D,N − D)] − δE[u1(D + 1,N − D − 1)] = [λpb + (1 − λ)pg]Fα − 1, for any D. (4)
Let us ﬁrst take a look at an example with two loan applicants and consider a deviation to
strategy s′′ in which a bank tests one applicant. If the tested applicant is a bad type the bank
rejects it and, without testing the other applicant, undercuts the interest rate to F−
α for the loans
to the other applicant. If the tested applicant is of good type then the bank oﬀers a loan to the
applicant at F−
α and raises the interest rate to F+
α for the loan to (or rejects) another untested
applicant. In this way the expected loan portfolio size for both banks will remain the same while
the distribution of the loan portfolio size changes a little. It is easy to check that the improvement
in the stage proﬁt for the deviating bank is:
∆E[π] = −c + λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)Fα,
and and ∆E[π] > 0 iﬀ c < λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)Fα.38
37The expected payoﬀ with no deviation is a linear combination of the expected payoﬀs with deviations in the form
of s
′(D), D = 0,1,...,N. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ for each deviation with s
′(D) must be the same.
38Recall Assumption 2: c ≥
(1−λ)λ(pg−pb)




35In our example with two loan applicants, if one bank deviates in the way we described above,
then the loan allocation is (1,1) with probability 1, while without a deviation, the loan allocation
is (2,0) with probability 1
4, (1,1) with probability 1, and (0,2) with probability 1
4. We know by
(4):











Thus with the deviation s′′, the expected continuation payoﬀ remains unchanged.
For more general case with more than two loan applicants, suppose that one bank deviate in
the way above. Let pk,N−k denote the probability of (k,N − k) for the two banks’ loan portfolio
sizes when no bank deviates, and p′
k,N−k as the probability of (k,N − k) for the two banks’ loan
portfolio size with the deviation. By symmetry, it is easy to check that:
 
k




k,N−kE[ui(k,N − k)], for bank i = 1,2.
There is a stage proﬁt improvement, while the expected continuation value remains the same,
a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. (Corollary 1) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. First consider the case
N − 2 ≥ Nα. Assume that there exists a SPPE with s = (n = 0, Nα < N, Fα) played on
the equilibrium path, where Fα is a constant larger than F∗ = 1
λpb+(1−λ)pg, and the continuation
value function does not depend on (χ1,χ2), i.e., the number of defaulted loans in each bank’s loan
portfolio.
Denote s′(D) = (n = 0, Nα = D, F−
α ) as a feasible deviation strategy, for some 0 ≤ D ≤ Nα.
Let N(D)/N(D) be the maximum/minimum possible number of applicants that accept loans oﬀered
by bank 2 when bank 1 deviates to s′(D), and let pk(D) be the probability of bank 2 getting k





= E[π1(s′(D′),s) + δ
N(D′)  
k=N(D′)








pk(D − 1)u1(D − 1,k)] (5)
= [λpb + (1 − λ)pg]Fα − 1 for any D.
36Consider the following deviation in which one bank tests one applicant. If the tested applicant
is good, then it oﬀers loan to this tested applicant at F−
α , oﬀers loan to a randomly picked non-
tested applicant at F+
α , and oﬀers loans to other randomly picked Nα − 2 applicants at Fα. If
the tested applicant is bad, it rejects the applicant, and oﬀers loan to other randomly picked Nα
applicants at Fα. We denote the above deviating strategy as s′′. We can check that given (5), s′′
gives the same expected continuation payoﬀ as s.
The improvement in the stage proﬁt for the deviating bank can be written as:
∆E[π] = −c + λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)Fα,
and the result comes out immediately.
The proof for the case Nα = N − 1 is similar, thus omitted.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. (Corollary 2) For the case with N = Nα, consider the deviation in which one bank tests
one applicant and oﬀers loan to that applicant at min{Fα}− > F∗ with probability 2N−1
2N when it is
good and rejects the applicant when it is bad. We can check this keep the distribution (D1,D2)
the same, and thus the continuation payoﬀ is the same with the deviation. The stage gain is
c − 2N−1
2N λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)min{Fα}.
For the case with N < Nα, consider the deviation in which one bank tests one applicant and
oﬀers loan to that applicant at min{Fα} when it is good, when it is bad, rejects the applicant and
picks another un-tested applicant to keep the total number of applicants it approves the same. We
denote the above deviating strategy as s′. Denote π(s,s) as π(N,Nα), and it is easy to understand
what π(N − 1,Nα − 1) means; we also denote π(N − 1,Nα − 1,Nα) as the expected payoﬀ of one
bank oﬀering loans to Nα −1 applicants out of N −1, while the other banks oﬀers to Nα of them.
It is easy to check that with the deviation to s′, the deviating bank’s expected payoﬀ is:








)(pg min{Fα} − 1) +
Nα
N




[(pg min{Fα} − 1) + π(N − 1,Nα − 1,Nα)]} + λπ(N,Nα) − c.









)[(1 − λ)pg min{Fα} + λpb min{Fα} − 1] +
Nα
N




){[(1 − λ)pg min{Fα} + λpb min{Fα} − 1] + π(N − 1,Nα − 1,Nα)}.
We have:








)λ(pg − pb)min{Fα}] + (1 −
Nα
N








λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)min{Fα}.
37Appendix 3: An Example of a PPE with Trigger Strategies
In this example, for simpliﬁcation, banks start with asymmetric strategies to reach a symmetric
loan distribution. Assume that each period there are two loan applicants (N = 2). Banks want
to keep the loan interest rate at F = X. The loan portfolio size distribution for the two banks
is determined as follows. When there is no credit worthiness testing, Bank 1 oﬀers loans to both
applicants at interest rate X, while Bank 2 oﬀers a loan to only one applicant at interest rate X−,
and rejects the other applicant. Each bank will get exactly one loan in equilibrium. They punish
any other loan distribution by playing stage Nash equilibrium forever.
Formally, the period one strategy for Bank 1 is s1 = (n = 0, Nα1 = 2, Fα1 = X); Bank 2’s
strategy is s2 = (n = 0, Nα2 = 1, Fα2 = X−). For a discount rate, δ, close enough to 1, Bank 1 does
not have an incentive to deviate by conducting credit worthiness testing, since if Bank 1 rejects one
bad-type applicant, while Bank 2 oﬀers loans to the other one, there will be a positive possibility
that the loan distribution will be diﬀerent from (1,1).39 However, with the above strategy Bank
2 might have an incentive to carry out testing while keeping the loan distribution equal to (1,1)
with probability 1. With δ close enough to 1, the only possible deviation, without changing the
loan portfolio distribution, is as follows. Bank 2 deviates to high credit standards by testing one
of the applicants. After carrying out the test, if the tested applicant is of bad type, then Bank 2
oﬀer a loan to the non-tested applicant at X− while rejecting the other one; if the tested applicant
is of good type, Bank 2 oﬀers a loan to it at X− while rejecting the other one. Formally Bank 2’s
deviation strategy can be written as s′
2 = (n = 1, Nα2(Ng), Nβ2(Ng), Fα2 = Fβ2 = X−), where:
Nα2(Ng) = 1, if Ng = 0
Nβ2(Ng) = 1, if Ng = 1.
We claim that if X is big enough, then Bank 2 will be strictly better oﬀ by deviating for some
level of test cost c. When Bank 2 does not deviate, the expected stage payoﬀ is:
Eπ2 = λ(pbX − 1) + (1 − λ)(pgX − 1).
When Bank 2 deviates as described above, the expected stage payoﬀ is:
Eπ′
2 = (1 − λ)(pgX − 1) + λ[(1 − λ)(pgX − 1) + λ(pbX − 1)] − c.
We have:
39It can be veriﬁed that other forms of deviation are also not incentive compatible for Bank 1.
38Eπ′
2 − Eπ2 = λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)X − c
> 0
iff c < λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb)X
Compare this condition with that of Assumption 2: c ≥
(1−λ)λ(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg . As long as X > F∗ =
1
λpb+(1−λ)pg, the parameter space is not empty.
However, with a trigger punishment, we can eliminate the incentive of Bank 2 to deviate through
credit worthiness testing. The idea is for both banks to test all applicants for T periods whenever
Bank 1’s borrower defaults while Bank 2’s borrower does not. When both banks test, if there is
no bad-type applicant, Bank 1 oﬀers loans to both applicants at X, and Bank 2 oﬀers a loan to
one applicant at X−. If there is one good-type applicant, only Bank 1 oﬀers a loan to the good
type applicant at X, while Bank 2 rejects all the applicants. Finally, if there are two bad-type
applicants, both banks reject all the applicants.
Now, we are ready to describe a trigger strategy that will support the PPE. At period t = 0,
Bank 1’s strategy is s1 = (n = 0, Nα1 = 2, Fα1 = X), and Bank 2’s strategy is s2 = (n = 0,
Nα2 = 1, Fα2 = X−). At t > 0, they will continue to play (s1,s1) unless one of the following two
cases occurred at t − 1:
(1) If they observe (D1t−1,D2t−1)  = (1,1), then they play (sd,sd) for the rest of the periods,
where sd = (n = 0, Nα = 2,Fα = F∗).
(2) Else, if they observe χ1t−1 = 0 and χ2t−1 = 1, then they play (sr
1,sr
1) at period t, where
sr
1 = (n = 2, Nβ1(Ngt), Nγ1(Ngt) = 0, Fβ1 = Fγ1 = X), sr
2 = (n = 2, Nβ2(Ngt),Nγ2(Ngt) = 0,
Fβ2 = Fγ2 = X−) and
Nβ1(Ngt) = 2 if Ngt = 2
= 1 if Ngt = 1
= 0 if Ngt = 0
Nβ2(Ngt) = 1 if Ngt = 2
= 0 if Ngt = 1
= 0 if Ngt = 0.
They will continue to play (sr
1,sr
2) unless one of the following two cases occurs at τ > t:
(2.1) If banks do not observe (1,1), (1,0), or (0,0),40 then they will play (sd,sd) for the rest of
40In fact, (D1,D2) depends on Ngτ−1, which is not public information, we have, on the equilibrium path,
(D1(Ngτ−1),D2(Ngτ−1))
= (1,1) if Ngτ−1 = 2
= (1,0) if Ngτ−1 = 1
= (0,0) if Ngτ−1 = 0.
39the time, where sd = (n = 0, Nα = 2,Fα = F∗).
(2.2) Else, if τ ≥ t+T, i.e. T periods have elapsed, then the banks go back to normal by playing
(s1,s2) as deﬁned above.
Formally, the trigger strategy is deﬁned as follows. Deﬁne period t to be normal if (a) t = 0;
or (b), t − 1 was normal, Dt−1 = (1,1) and χ1t−1 = 1; or (c), t − T − 1 was normal, Dt−1 =
(D1(Ngt−1),D2(Ngt−1)), and t−1 was reversionary (as we will deﬁne in a moment). Deﬁne period
t to be reversionary if (a) t−1 was normal, Dt−1 = (1,1) and χ1t−1 = 0; or (b), t−1 is reversionary,
and t < T or else t − T is normal, and Dt−1 = (D1(Ngt−1),D2(Ngt−1)). Deﬁne period t to be





(s1,s2) if t is normal
(sr
1,sr
2) if t is reversionary
(sd,sd) if t is devastating.
Each bank faces a stationary Markov dynamic programming problem. Its optimal strategy is
to play (s1,s2) in normal periods, play (sr
1,sr
2) in reversionary periods, and play (sd,sd) in deviating
periods. The play (sd,sd) is a threatening play, which will never occur on the equilibrium path,
while both (s1,s2) and (sr
1,sr
2) will occur.
If t is a normal period, and banks play (s1,s2), then the probability of switching to a reversionary
period at time t + 1 is:
q = λ(1 − pb)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg] + (1 − λ)(1 − pg)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg].
With bank 2 deviating to s′
2, We have:
q = (1 − λ)(1 − pg) + λ(1 − pb).
However, if one Bank 2 plays s′
2 = (n = 1, Nα2(Ng), Nβ2(Ng), Fα2 = Fβ2 = X−) where:
Nα2(Ng) = 1, if Ng = 0
Nβ2(Ng) = 1, if Ng = 1,
this probability becomes:
q′ = λ(1 − pb)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg] + (1 − λ)[λ(1 − pb) + (1 − λ)(1 − pg)]pg.
We can see that:
∆q = q′ − q = λ(1 − λ)(pg − pb).
In words, the above condition says that when Bank 2 deviates to s′
2, the probability of switching
to a reversionary period increases. By hypothesis Bank 2 is deviating. Now, having deﬁned the
trigger strategies, we check the incentive constraint for Bank 2. In the normal period, Bank 2’s
In PPE, however, banks’ strategies can not depend on non-public information.
40expected stage payoﬀ from playing s2 = (n = 0, Nα2 = 1, Fα2 = X−) given s1 = (n = 0, Nα1 = 2,
Fα1 = X) is:
Eπn
2 = λ(pbX − 1) + (1 − λ)(pgX − 1).
In the reversionary period, Bank 2’s expected stage payoﬀ from playing sr
2 = (n = 2, Nβ2(Ngt),
Nγ2 = 0, Fβ2 = Fγ2 = X−) given sr
1 = (n = 2, Nβ1(Ngt), Nγ1 = 0, Fβ1 = Fγ1 = X) is:
Eπr




2 = λ(pbX − 1) + λ(1 − λ)(pgX − 1) + 2c
> 0
iﬀ c > −
1
2
[λ(pbX − 1) + λ(1 − λ)(pgX − 1)]
It is easy to check this condition is implied by Assumptions 1 and 2.41
Let Wn
2 (s) denote the expected payoﬀ in a normal period when Bank 2 plays s2. Given the
other bank is playing the trigger strategy, Bank 2’s expected discounted present value from playing
s2 is:
Wn
i (s2) = Eπn
































41By Assumption 2, c ≥
(1−λ)λ(pg−pb)
λpb+(1−λ)pg , we have
(1 − λ)λ(pg − pb)




[λ(pbX − 1) + λ(1 − λ)(pgX − 1)]}
=
λ
λpb + (1 − λ)pg
{2(1 − λ)(pg − pb) + {[λpb + (1 − λ)pg]X − λ}pb
−(1 − λ)pg + (1 − λ)(pgX − 1)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg]}
≥
λ
λpb + (1 − λ)pg
{(1 − λ)(pg − pb) + (1 − λ)(pgX − 1)[λpb + (1 − λ)pg]}
> 0,
where we use Assumption 1:
[λpb + (1 − λ)pg]X > 1.
41In the normal period, Bank 2 can deviate from the equilibrium strategy by playing s′
2 as deﬁned
earlier. The short-run payoﬀ to Bank 2 is:
Eπ′
2 = (1 − λ)(pgX − 1) + λ[(1 − λ)(pgX − 1) + λ(pbX − 1)] − c












In order to make the trigger strategy the best response to each other in normal periods, we
need:
Wn
i (s2) > Wn
i (s′
2).
It is easily veriﬁed that there is no incentive for either bank to deviate in a reversionary period
as long as δ is close enough to 1 and T is large enough.
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